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Technological advances have facilitated investment in collectibles through online auction markets, where
information regarding product characteristics, current and historical prices, and product availability is
available to millions of market participants. However, market inefficiencies may still exist, where prices do
not reflect market information and where savvy speculators can profit. Using unit root and variance ratio tests,
we examine 8538 rare stamp and 56,997 rare coin auctions to evaluate the efficiency of online markets. In
particular, we study market liquidity, abnormal returns and weak-form efficiency. We find an inverse
relationship between market efficiency and liquidity. Bidder competition intrinsic to liquidity increases the
chances that uninformed bidders drive up item prices, leading to the observed market inefficiencies.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
It is common knowledge among investors that thin markets are
less efficient than markets that have broader following and participa-
tion. Many housing markets, some stock markets, mortgage-backed
securities markets, and collectible markets represent examples of thin
markets, where purchase and sales transactions, trading, and
exchange may be sporadic, and price discovery may be challenging.
Together, nevertheless, they represent billions of dollars of exchange
in market transactions. Increasingly, we are seeing relatively thin
markets being impacted by the burgeoning technologies of the
Internet, permitting such innovative approaches to transaction-
making as electronic call auctions, reverse auctions, and numerous
forms of digital intermediation.
With so much price information available to bidders and sellers in
online auctions, the question of market efficiency in these collectible
markets presents itself. Bymarket efficiency, we mean that the market
price is based upon all information available in the market. From this
perspective, weak-form efficiency in a market occurs where the price
for every good on the market reflects all historical information, and is
available to any market participant [13]. Market efficiency is different
from operational efficiency in that it deals with equal access to
information by all market participants. By contrast, operational
efficiency deals with maximizing some aspect of the operation, with
little concern about the transfer of information among all participants
in themarket. For example, Vragov [49] discusses how online auctions
are operationally efficient in that they allow the seller to maximize
common and private value surplus.
Intermediaries utilize technology to bring together geographically-
fragmented markets, as a way to improve financial efficiency and
market quality. These markets exhibit the classical characteristics of
thin markets. We investigate the efficiency and persistence of
abnormal returns in collectible markets. Collectibles are often viewed
as an investment alternative, which can be used for diversification or
as a hedge against inflation (like gold bullion) with some rare coins
even quadrupling in value after several years. Swiatek [47] discusses
how rare coins can be appealing in a bear market, and Pesando [41],
Mei and Moses [37], and Wood [50] compare collectible returns to
stock market prices using financial economics theory, like the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM). Ashenfelter and Graddy [4] also point out
research that shows returns on collectible items can surpass returns
from fixed income securities.
Typically, auctions have not been viewed as very efficientmarkets, as
an uninformed bidder could end up paying too much for an item or a
seller could end up selling an item for a fraction of its worth [43,48].
Internet technologies, however, have increased the flow and availability
of information in online auctions, allowing millions to interact, and
promoting participation across the globe. This technological transfor-
mation has made auctions into a type of exchange, akin to a stock or
commodities exchange. Indeed, the volume of transactions in online
auctions now surpasses the volume of stocks that are bought and sold in
many countries.Withmanymore items for sale, andmanymore bidders
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bidding, online auctions allow collectibles as investments to take on a
new practicality, making investments in collectibles bought and sold in
online auctions more feasible for the typical investor. Through this lens,
we investigate how efficiency has adjusted with market liquidity, as
more buyers and sellers have entered the online auctionmarket and the
ratio of buyers to sellers has changed.
Abnormal returns occur when price levels differ from expected or
previous sale prices, resulting in high or low returns for an investor.
They occur due to new information in themarket. Abnormal returns in
an efficient market are persistent, indicating that other investors share
a new common valuation, whereas an inefficient market with low
levels of persistent returns indicates that abnormal returns are
ignored. Then prices revert back to the mean price after the abnormal
return occurs.We do not deny that under-informed bidders maymake
bids that may be too high, yet the existence of high bids is likely to
inflate the price that rational and informed investors will be wiling to
pay for an asset.
In efficient markets, abnormal returns reflect new information, so
that abnormal returns in one period carry forward to future prices. In
inefficient markets, the effect of abnormal returns are often
minimized or eliminated, as prices revert to a mean price. With this
inmind, wewill not claim that online auctions, in their current form at
least, can ever be viewed as completely efficient markets. We will
explore the persistence of abnormal returns to determine how much
current returns seem to affect the level of future returns. We will
check if future returns are unpredictable, as they would be in an
efficient market.
We ask: Are online auction markets, such as those for rare coins
and rare stamp markets, efficient? What factors might affect the
persistence of abnormal returns in online auctions? How can we
measure the efficiency and persistence of abnormal returns on assets
traded in online markets? Can we implement a research design to
assess the efficiency and persistence of abnormal returns in online
auctions for collectible coins and stamps? How does the amount of
trading activity play a role?
There aremajor differences between a stock market, where market
efficiency is typically studied, and an online auction market. The first
difference deals with short selling, where investors can take advantage
of an overpriced stock by selling the stock now and agreeing to buy it
later. There is no way to easily mimic short selling in online auction
markets, thus allowing inflated prices to persist. A collectibles investor
is able to place an item for sale, and then purchase it in the same
market later, but the immediacy of the stock market is not present.
The second difference deals with the effects of individual bidders.
Unlike the stock market, two bidders can drive a price above the
normal valuation for an item. (This is a basis for winner's curse in
online auctions.) These two factors can introduce inflated prices for an
item, as two or more bidders bid up its price, resulting in high prices
that may persist for the sale of the item in the future.
Far from making inefficiency irrelevant though, the differences
between online auction markets and stock markets make studying
efficiency imperative for investors. Online auctions have challenges
that stock markets do not. Since investors make money by taking
advantage of inefficiencies, these inefficiencies can make online
auctions potentially more profitable than stock market investments.
We will expose inefficiencies that may exist in online auction
collectible markets for the investor to exploit. To do this, we provide
a measure of weak-form efficiency in online auctions for collectibles,
and confirm a relationship between market efficiency and market
liquidity in the rare coin and rare stamp markets. Thus, increases in
market liquidity (marked by an increase in bidder competition) lead
to decreases in online auction market efficiency. The theoretical
intuition that drives this finding is that, with stock markets, increase
in the number of investors would indeed lead to greater efficiency as
more investors search to profit from inefficiencies. By contrast, in
online auctions, high liquidity involves many bidders competing for
the same item. It increases the likelihood that uninformed collectors
drive up collectibles prices.
We draw upon theory in financial economics for this work. IS
researchers are often concerned with how information is transferred
among participants in online systems, and the effects this information
has on system users. This becomes especially interesting when the
system is a market, and the market is created with the new
technologies of the Internet. We leverage the theory of market
efficiency to discover the effects of the flow of information on prices
in an electronic market.
We assess online auctions for collectible coins and stamps as a type
of market exchange. We focus on rare coins and stamps that are
commonly traded. We treat instances where the amount of trading
and transaction-making varies, permitting us to consider what
happens in online markets with more thinly-traded assets. Our
research design enables us to investigate how the persistence of
abnormal returns increases with market liquidity, as the ratio of
buyers to auctions changes in online auction markets. This lets us
determine how market liquidity may affect efficiency and the
persistence of abnormal returns based on the price changes. Using
unit root tests attributable to Dickey and Fuller [16] and variance ratio
analysis based on Lo and MacKinlay [33] on data from a multi-year
study involving two different markets, we show that online markets
tend to be efficient if the number of auctions is relatively large in
relation to the number of bidders. Although trading in online auctions
is thinner than in the stock markets, we nevertheless find that online
auctions increase the viability of investments in collectibles as an
alternative to stocks because of their wide reach and the extent of
seller and bidder participation.
Section 2 assesses relevant theory for thinmarkets and technology,
collectible auctions, and the related concepts of market efficiency, as a
basis for our model development. Section 3 discusses the specification
of unit root and variance ratio tests, as well as some adjustments that
enable us to estimate our data for relatively thinly-traded collectibles
exchanged in online auctions. Section 4 lays out our empirical analysis
of a large set of data on collectible coins. We beginwith an overview of
the data set, continue with a discussion of modeling and estimation
issues that are specific to a market (e.g., the rare coin market or the
rare stampmarket), and finish with a presentation of the econometric
results and their interpretation. Section 5 discusses the collectible
stamp data that we analyze, and the contrasting results that we
obtained. Thereafter, Section 6 provides an interpretation of our
results, and analyzes the patterns of abnormal returns observed in the
collectible coin and stamp markets. We conclude with limitations and
future research.
2. Online auction markets and market efficiency
We next discuss properties of thin markets, collectibles auction,
and market efficiency concepts.
2.1. Thin markets and technology
Certain factors that exist in markets can cause inefficiencies. For
example, the depth of the market is often limited by the degree to
which assets are traded in different physical, geographic, or electronic
virtual locations, causing market fragmentation. Also, Mendelson [38]
points out that market fragmentation can occur when potential
market participants cannot find one another, do not know that the
other party exists, or otherwise cannot transact because of spatial,
informational or other types of barriers. When there are relatively
fewer traders in a market with thinly-traded assets, the market is
more likely to be fragmented. The trading of securities before the
advent of the telegraph is a classic example of fragmented markets, as
discussed by Garbade and Silber [23]. Securities traded at vastly
different prices at different stock exchanges around the United States
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because information could not travel between the exchanges quickly.
The telegraph, a technological innovationwith sweeping and dramatic
effects, almost immediately brought together geographically-sepa-
rated markets, bringing greater similarity in prices. Just as technology
was able to close the information gap in geographically-fragmented
but relatively deep markets, so technology can help market partici-
pants to find one another in markets where assets are more thinly
traded. When the markets consolidate, market prices will better
reflect information that is known to all participants across the space
that the market can cover.
Marketswith thin trading of assets aremore likely to be volatile than
deeper markets, all else equal, due to the lack of price discovery [46]. At
the heart of efficiency studies is the availability and transfer of accurate
information about an asset. Transaction-making provides a basis for
information tobeexchangedby sellers andbuyers aboutprice levels that
are appropriate, so when there are fewer transactions, as with
traditional offline auctions, it becomes more difficult to determine the
appropriate price. Although stock markets, with millions of traders per
day, will always have more transactions than online auction markets, at
least for the foreseeable future, Internet technology has given online
auctions a large increase in market depth with the ability to transfer
information on millions of transactions that allowmuch information to
transfer among buyers and sellers. This reduces market fragmentation
and allowing analysis of online auction transactions at a new level and
giving online auction researchers the ability to analyze online auctions
using well-developed financial tools.
2.2. Private valuation and common valuation
Private values arise from a collector’s personal valuation for an
asset that is not shared by the rest of the market. For example, if the
next coin or stamp they target completes a collection, then the
collector may be willing to pay more for the item. With no common
valuation, financial economics topics such as efficiency become moot
since private valuation affects bid levels rather than commonly-held
information. Although many contend that private valuation almost
always exists in collectible markets, recent research from Bajari and
Hortaçsu [5] and Easley et al. [19] empirically demonstrate that there
is a significant common value component to online auctions of
collectibles, specifically rare coin online auctions. Their results show
that although private valuation may (and probably does) occur in
online auctions, the common valuation component is powerful
enough to allow coin bid levels to be compared across bidders and
across auctions.
We have examined common and private valuation in online auctions
in two ways. First, we have implemented Bajari and Hortaçsu's [5]
technique and have supported their finding that a significant level of
common valuation exists in our collectible data, such that the level of
valuation attributable to commonvaluation significantly exceeds the level
of valuation attributable to private valuation. Second, we have conducted
unit root testswhich show that private valuation has no significant impact
on our results. Thus, we are confident that common valuation dominates
the online coin and stamp auctionmarkets. Analysis of these markets can
be achieved by using existing empirical tools for financial economics.
2.3. Theoretical perspectives on market efficiency
Samuelson [44] developed the efficient market hypothesis, which
contends that markets, like the stock market, tend to reflect all
information that market participants have available. Because stock
prices in an efficient market reflect all available information, no one
can accurately predict which stocks outperform or underperform in
the next period in an efficient market. Unexpected or abnormal
returns in one period persist into all later periods, and it is impossible
to predict whether the price will rise or fall, even after an abnormally
large price increase or decrease. Furthermore, efficiency is the result of
savvy investors who scour the market searching for inefficiencies,
recognizing that asset prices that do not reflect all available
information. This can lead to exceptional profits, and prices of in-
vestments automatically self-correct based on new information. Thus,
even if a multitude of investors are inexperienced and prone to
mistakes, an efficient market will force the price to reflect all available
information.
The efficient market hypothesis has been widely researched as it
applies to the stock market [3,22,25,28]. Boudoukh et al. [8] have noted
that there are large and statistically significant autocorrelations and
serial cross-correlations between portfolio returns over a short horizon.
This goes against the efficient market hypothesis. Some researchers
maintain that these correlations do not inform investors in any
meaningful way, so that the aim of market efficiency is furthered. For
example, research in the early 1960s [2,12,26,29]mostly provided strong
support for the hypothesis that stock investments follow a randomwalk,
which gave securities analysts no basis to predict prices from one period
to the next. Fama [20] discussed how, in tests of the random walk,
researchers by and large are unable to statistically reject the efficient
market hypothesis (also called the randomwalk hypothesis). However, in
a later article, Fama and French [21] rejected the randomwalkmodel on
the basis of analysis of additional data.
More recently, Malkiel [36] commented on new findings on auto-
correlations and serial cross-correlations for short horizon returns. He
claimed that data mining that has been performed in some studies has
resulted in findings that are surprising but still spurious, for example,
the work of Lo and MacKinlay [33]. Also, he suggests that reviewers of
papers at the leading journals have tended to set aside confirmatory
results as lacking surprise value, while more surprising results that
show deviations from a randomwalk may be more readily accepted in
peer review, leading to a disconfirmation bias of existing theory.
Malkiel further argued that any statistically significant variation from
a randomwalk is not significant in a practical sense. Any gain that can
be acquired from taking advantage of market inefficiencies is so small
so as to not exceed the operational costs involved in adjusting an
investment position.
Lo and MacKinlay [32,33] have argued that unit roots are neither
necessary nor sufficient for random walk efficiency tests, based upon
Fama's [20] definition of efficiency. These authors and others have
shown that efficiency is a unit root only under the assumption of risk
neutrality [30,31,34]. Lo and MacKinlay [33] stress that risk-averse
investors will have a well-functioning efficient market, and prices that
can be forecasted in an efficient market, only such that the market
reflects all available information.
Research on financial markets divides market efficiency into three
categories [7,13]. Weak-form efficiency occurs where excess returns
cannot be estimated using historical financial information. Semi-strong
form efficiency exists where market prices reflect all publicly available
information. Strong-form efficiency ensues when market prices reflect
all publicly available and privately held information. We will examine
collectible coins and stamps, and focus only onwhether it is possible to
estimate returns based on historical financial information. We do not
address news items about new finds or the scarcity of coins and
stamps, due to the limitations that we faced with the collection of
relevant data. Thus, we examine weak-form efficiency.
We theorize that market liquidity has the opposite effect in stock
markets as in online auctions. Liquidity implies that there are more
buyers bidding on the assets in an exchange. In stockmarkets, informed
bidders bid up an under-valued asset and bid down an overvalued asset
through short selling. This permits an investor to sell at item
immediately at an overvalued price and to buy it at a later date. Higher
liquidity implies that there is a greater probability of two informed
investors entering a market to drive the price to an efficient level.
The absence of short selling in online auctions makes market
liquidity have the opposite effect on online auction market efficiency.
By definition, a highly liquid item has a large number of potential
5R.J. Kauffman et al. / Decision Support Systems 48 (2009) 3–13
bidders, resulting in an increased chance that two uninformed bidders
will bid up an item. With no short-selling mechanism though, there is
noway for informed bidders to bid down an overpriced asset in online
auctions. So even though we agree with the literature in that market
liquidity has a positive effect onmarket efficiency in stockmarkets, we
contend that the absence of short selling in online auctions should add
inefficiencies to online auction markets and cause market liquidity to
have an inverse relationship.
3. Methodologies for estimating efficiency in online markets
We investigate market efficiency and the persistence of abnormal
returns related to asset price differences over time in the collectible coin
and stamp markets. We next illustrate the use of unit root tests to
examine returns to stamp and coin trading, similar to Fama's [20]
investigation of efficiency in the stock market. Such tests enable us to
deliver a new reading on the persistence of abnormalmarket returns, as
discussed by Grossman and Stiglitz [24], that may exist for collectible
coin and stamp trading at various points in time in Internetmarkets. Our
goal is to determine how market liquidity, as measured by the ratio of
buyers to auctions, may affect a traded asset's returns, based on past
patterns of returns in online auctions for collectible stamps and coins.
We develop empirical models to address econometric challenges of
measuring efficiency in markets that exhibit thin trading of assets.
3.1. Market efficiency tests using unit roots
To examine the effects of market liquidity on the degree of ef-
ficiency and persistence of abnormal returns in online coin and stamp
auctions, it is necessary to define each collectible i in terms of the
percentage of the price that obtained during the first time it traded
relative to a later period t. We then evaluate the return on each traded
asset based upon Pit =
priceit
pricei1
and ΔPit=Pit−Pi,t−1, so that:
Rit =
Pit
Pi;t− l
− 1
 !
=
ΔPit
Pi;t− l
 !
ð1Þ
where
priceit the final selling price for the collectible item i on day t;
pricei1 the average price for the collectible item i on the first day
that it sells;
Pit the indexed price for the collectible item i on day t;
ΔPit the indexed price change for the collectible item i on day t
compared to the previous selling price at time t− l;
Rit the percentage return for the collectible item i on day t.
Malkiel [35,36] initially presented the idea that future returns on
market-traded assets are not predictable from past price performance
in an efficient market. Thus, prices in efficient markets should follow a
randomwalk. Consider the following autoregression function of asset
returns:
Rit = αi + βiRi;t− l + εit : ð2Þ
This expression is a unit root test for stationarity, as advocated by
Dickey and Fuller [16]. The estimated change in returns, Rit, on asset i in
the current period t are defined as a function of returns in a previous
period t− l, plus a drift parameter α that is specific to asset i. The
parameter, βi, can provide information on whether returns for asset i
are predictable based on previous returns. βi can be expressed as:
βi =
cov Rit ;Ri;t−1
 
σ2 Ri;t−1
  : ð3Þ
Malkiel [36] contends that a random walk occurs when βi=1. He
further describes how returns based on randomwalks characterize an
efficient market. He goes on to note that various stock market
anomalies, such as the 2000 dotcom bubble burst, were devastating
because they were not anticipated. This adds support for the random
walk model as a test of the efficient market hypothesis.
If βi−1 is significantly different from 0, then βi will be significantly
different from 1, and there will be a predictable drift in returns rather
than a pure random walk. Note that β is not the same as that used in
risk-return models such as CAPM. However, the parameter is consistent
in its use relative to other tests of the Dickey–Fullermethodwhen a unit
root test is implemented. With βi close to 1, price changes are
persistent, and thus current price changes are reflected in prices well
into the foreseeable future. When βi=1, our best estimate of Rit is drift
parameter αi plus the return in the previous period Ri,t−1. Though we
have an estimate, we have no way to know whether the return in this
period will outperform or underperform that expectation. As βi
approaches zero, prices more immediately revert to a mean price, and
price changes do not persist.
3.2. Market efficiency tests using variance ratios
Lo and MacKinlay [32,33] and Cochrane [10] have suggested that a
variance ratio test is more appropriate than a unit root test to determine
if a series followsa randomwalk. Theystate that fora randomwalkof asset
returns to exist, such as those that might be seen for returns on certain
investments, the variances of the returnsmust be uncorrelated.Moreover,
they state that the asset return variances should be consistent across
periods for any traded asset if market efficiency is thought to exist. See Lo
andMacKinlay [33] foradditional details. Soadata setof returnsonagiven
setof assets canbe segmentedand then thevariances canbe compared for
consistency. Following Lo andMacKinlay [33], we defineXt=ln(Pt) as the
logarithm of price for asset i (with this subscript suppressed).
Tomake thismore concrete, the reader should recognize that data sets
can be segmented based on returns on assets across different periods of
time and that nomatter how the segmentation occurs, for a market to be
efficient, the variances should be the same across each segment. For
example, one-period returns, Xt−Xt−1, can be compared to two-period
returns, Xt−Xt−2, and so on. Segmentation of the data can also involve
cuts of asset returns based on other period returns, such as three-period
returns and four-period returns. Examining four-period returns, for
example, might yield four subsets, q, each with n=2500 asset returns
each, for nq=2500·4=10,000 total observations in the data set.
The unbiased maximum-likelihood estimators of the mean, μ, and
variance, σ 2, of the transaction prices, based upon the observed returns
in terms of the one-perioddifference of observed asset prices,Xt−Xt−1,
are as follows for q segments of the data, each with n observations:
μ̂ =
1
nq
Xnq
t=1
Xt − Xt−1ð Þ ð4Þ
and
σ̂ 2 =
1
nq − 1
Xnq
t=1
Xt−Xt−1−μˆ
 2
: ð5Þ
In Eqs. (4) and (5), μ̂ and σ̂2 are estimates of the mean, μ, and
variance, σ 2, with a sample composed of q subsamples with n
observations each seen in the adjustments 1/nq and 1/(nq−1). The
denominator of the right-hand side of the expression for the variance
reflects an adjustment for qN1 segments.
To describe the intuition behind their use, we employ the
arguments of Cochrane [10], who used variance ratios to examine
randomwalks for GDP. Imagine that prices follow a pure randomwalk,
as shown in Eq. (1) above. Cochrane showed that a randomwalk then
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can be expressed in terms of the number of time-differenced
segments into which the data are split. If the asset's returns do not
exhibit a trend because there is no reversion to the mean, then the
variance of its returns will approach a constant, 2σ 2, which is twice
the conditional variance of the series. Reversion to the mean, in this
context, implies that the serial correlation of the returns becomes
more negative as the holding period of the asset lengthens (up to
some point) [10]. This reversion to the mean, which is a stationary
series per Dickey and Fuller [16], is indicative of an inefficient market.
An efficient market occurs when the expected return is the previous
period's return, which Dickey and Fuller note is a non-stationary
series.
If the asset prices, Xt, revert toward a mean value, then Xt will be
trend-stationary, and the trend line for the series should decline
toward zero. Lo and MacKinlay [32] describe a technique for a
maximum-likelihood unbiased estimation of var(Xt−Xt−1) that
allows for overlapping time differences of Xt when the variance σq̂2
is estimated. The idea of overlapping time differences comes with the
differences in asset prices between period t and t−2, t−1 and t−3,
and t−2 and t−4, etc., as opposed to with sequential time differences,
t and t−1, and then between t−1 and t−2, for example. This allows
for an entire range of values in a data set to be used, maximizing the
use of the available information. It also permits the analyst to evaluate
the use of nq−q+1 observations, rather than fewer observations, as
would be the case if no overlaps were allowed. This gives rise to an
estimated subsample variance:
σ̂ 2q =
1
m
Xnq
t=q
Xt−Xt−q−qμˆ
 2 ð6Þ
where
m = q nq − q + 1ð Þ 1− 1
n
 
: ð7Þ
Consistent with Lo and MacKinlay [32], we define the variance
ratio as:
Vq =
σˆ 2q
σˆ 2
ð8Þ
We relied on Lo and MacKinlay for their derivation of the variance
ratio. The interested reader should examine their work for the logic and
additional details of derivation of the variance ratio as a means to test
market efficiency. If a market is efficient for the q subsets of the data
that are examined, then it should be that Vq≅1. This indicates that the
variance of the returns remains relatively constant throughout all time
periods q that are considered. If Vq is significant and different than 1,
then the variance of the returns is not consistent over time, and this
provides some evidence of inefficiency in the market. When Vq
approaches zero, this is indicative of reversion to the mean. This
might imply that there is a mean price and that markets which
overprice an asset will tend to correct in the next cycle. On the other
hand, when Vq is significant and greater than one in the presence of
positive first-order autocorrelation (e.g., with the continuation of a
trend), indicates that good returns on an investment in one period are
indicative of continuing good investment returns in the future.
Lo and MacKinlay [32] suggest a statistic, zq⁎, to test for market
efficiency in the presence of heteroskedastic error terms:
zq⁎ =
Vq − 1
  ffiffiffiffiffi
nq
pffiffiffiffi
θˆq
q ; zq⁎eN 0;1ð Þ: ð9Þ
The null hypothesis, H0, is that there is a random walk in asset
price changes, indicating market efficiency and no opportunities for
achieving abnormal returns. Under the null hypothesis, then, the zq⁎
statistic should have a zero mean. A non-zero mean, in contrast, will
be an indicator of the absence of a random walk in this environment,
as well as an indicator of the presence of market inefficiency.
We detected heteroskedasticity in our data, which is not surprising.
Lo and MacKinlay [33] introduced a homoskedastic error term, z(k), to
cover the case where heteroskedasticity cannot be detected. The
authors point out that returns on most assets, including stocks, usually
show some degree of heteroskedasticity. We determined that tests
which assume homoskedasticity are not appropriate for this research.
The heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators are:
θˆq =
Xq−1
l=1
2 q− lð Þ
q
 2
δˆ lð Þ ð10Þ
and
Â lð Þ =
nq
Pnq
t= l + 1
Xt−Xt−1− μˆ
	 
2 Xt− l−Xt− l−1− μˆ	 
2
Pnq
t=1
Xt−Xt−1− μˆ
	 
2 2 : ð11Þ
3.3. Appropriateness and challenges of efficiency analysis for online
auction market returns
Wenext will justify the use of unit root and variance ratio tests that
are developed in financial economics for application to the online
auctions. There are crucial differences between the stock market and
the online auction market. We address these differences by looking at
how they affect our financial analysis, and discussing the contrasting
econometric techniques can be used to handle these differences.
3.3.1. Information and ability
Professional investors who invest in the stock market are well
informed, and equipped with the necessary training to be effective
market traders. The same probably cannot be said for participants in
the online auction markets. They should be viewed as hobbyists for
the most part. Nevertheless, there are many professional traders
among them. They act as professional dealers who often operate real-
world collectible coin and stamp shops. Few of them know about
valuation techniques involving risk and return, or the application of
net present value or portfolio management techniques to control risk.
Bodie et al. [7] point out that trained investors will take advantage of
any inefficiencies in stock markets, making inefficiencies disappear by
the time typical investors can profit from them. Thus, all stock investors
do not need to be informed, but rather just a segment of the market
needs to be informed in order for price-correcting transactions to be
made so that markets approach efficiency. This may be different for the
online auction markets, where a pair of uninformed bidders can raise
the price of an item to a level that informed bidders are not willing to
match.
3.3.2. Uniformity
It may be tempting to view financial products like stocks, as being
uniform across the market while products in online auction markets,
such as rare coins and stamps, might be heterogeneous in quality.
However, stocks change not only from stock to stock, but also from day
to day as well, so that even companies can change drastically in
relatively short periods. Coin and stamps do not vary much and are
uniform across investors and time, unlike stocks. Thus, they are more
similar to commodities than stocks.
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The only differences between coins and stamps occur in terms of
four factors: year minted or printed; the denomination of the coin or
stamp; whether there are special conditions that are noteworthy
relative to value, such as mint marks or mounting hinges; and the
overall condition. These factors are probably more easily discerned
than that myriad of factors that can affect a stock price, and all of these
factors are easily detectible through the kind of text-based pattern
matching that we have implement in the data collection work in this
research. Moreover, most collectors typically agree on the valuation of
a collectible once these four criteria have been identified.
3.3.3. Regulation
Both stock markets and online auction markets have the potential for
information asymmetry. “Insider traders” can use non-public information
toprofitably trade, takingadvantageof uninformed investors,while online
auction sellers can misrepresent the quality of the product that they are
selling. However, though thesemarkets have the potential for information
asymmetry, bothhave introduced steps that limit the effect of information
asymmetry. For the stock market, regulation exists that insist on accurate
reporting of information for investors, and punish insider trading, so that
traders are prohibited from profiting from insider information.
There are fewer regulations for online auction transactions than
there are for stock markets, yet anti-fraud regulations apply to sales in
online auctions, with the possibility of lawsuits and even criminal action
if a product is misrepresented. In addition, online auctionmarketplaces,
like eBay, implement reputation systems that can hurt an opportunistic
seller's future sales. Reputation systems have the twofold effect of
deterring seller opportunism and punishing fraudulent or opportunistic
actions [14,15]. This tends to drive out sellers who profit from
information asymmetries and reduces the chance that an online auction
market devolves into a “market for lemons” [1].
3.3.4. Thin markets
Thin markets occur when certain assets trade infrequently in
comparison to others. In some settings, trading of these assets may be
insufficient to the extent that it is not possible to effectively support
price discovery for them. In research involving stock returns, the
number of periods between trades of an asset is often set to 1 (or l=1).
For thinly-traded assets though, this cannot always be done. It may be
two or more periods between trades, so that the pattern of trading is
spotty, and it is not always possible to obtain transaction data for asset
prices period by period. Our research is focused on evaluating market
efficiency for collectible items, and specifically those that are thinly-
traded. Other researchers have previously examined the efficiency of
the collectible art market, where trading occurs in a similar way and
makes price discovery more difficult [6,41].
To address the impact of thin trading for the evaluation of market
efficiency in a specific market, Dimson and Marsh [18] recommended
making adjustments to account for infrequent trades. Although their
method is typically used when analyzing risk-adjusted returns, the same
intuitionapplies to theempirical unit root analysis thatwewill conduct for
this research. A thinly-traded investment weighting approach can be
derived from theirweighting scheme recommended to reduce the impact
of thinly-traded securities when using the unit root test for an asset via:
βt = cov
ΔRtffiffiffiffi
dt
p ;Rt− lffiffiffiffi
dt
p ! = σ 2 ΔRlffiffiffiffidtp
 !
+ 1: ð12Þ
The variable d indicates the number of periods that have elapsed
since the last trade of asset i up to time t. Without adjustment, thinly-
traded investments have a corrupting effect on unit root regression
analysis. A number of methods can be used to adjust for infrequent
trading as well. For example, Bradfield [9] describes two categories.
One category is referred to as Cohen methods, which use aggregation
of lagged and leading regression coefficients [11,17,45]. The second
category is trade-to-trade methods, which weight transactions based
on the number of periods since the last trade, especially Dimson and
Marsh [18]. The Dimson–Marsh correction adjusts the weight of
thinly-traded assets in the regression, and reducing the inflating effect
that thinly-traded investments have on the value of β.
4. Study 1: online market efficiency for collectible coins
We now turn to a discussion and analysis of the first of two
collectible markets: coins.
4.1. The collectible rare coin data
We employed a software agent to collect prices on coins that were
transacted on eBay during various periods across the years 1999, 2000
and 2001, 2002 and 2005. The earlier years of data were collected
between April 24 and September 10, 2002. The later 2005 data were
obtained in 2006. Data collection agents only included auctions of
individual coins. They excluded auctions that did not sell the items
that were offered, auctions that ended with a buy-it-now option, and
listings that contained multiple items.
Admissible coins in our data set required that they had to have
transacted for US$10 or more. This helps to increase the probability
that coin transactions were the product of more knowledgeable and
committed collectors, as opposed to “newbies” who might only be
willing to spend several dollars to try out trading in the online
environment. Our customized software agent can discriminate among
other aspects of the description of a coin to effectively identify the
exact coin for sale. It also can tell whether the transaction itemwas not
actually a coin, but some sort of coin-collecting related supplies or
commemorative medals, etc. Table 1 shows some descriptive
information about the data that we used for this study.
4.2. Estimation issues
There are a number of issues that affect the validity of empirical
tests of financial theories. One consideration is the extent to which the
findings of an analysis of market efficiency may be susceptible to the
presence of outliers and extreme points in the data. To reduce the
possibility of corruption due to influential data points, we employed
an outlier test recommended by Neter et al. [40]. This led to the
removal of about 2% (actually 748 or 1.99%) of the observations out of
the 37,584 total observations.
Unit root analysis relies heavily on regression results to test for a unit
root, a coefficient of one on an autoregressive term in a regression. We
employ robust regression instead of ordinary least squares (OLS) since
robust regression is more resilient to violations of the classical OLS
assumptions. Robust regression is resistant to influences of a small part of
Table 1
Data collected for the empirical analysis of the efficiency of online coin markets.
Year From To Number of
auctions
Bidders Sellers Unique
coins
Mean
selling
price
Average
bids per
auction
1999 5/1/99 6/9/99 2169 1769 484 415 $41.36 6.27
2000 1/2/00 2/1/00 1884 1871 492 348 $39.10 5.78
2001 3/24/01 4/24/01 3913 3721 808 693 $41.66 5.93
2002 4/24/02 8/28/02 35,174 14,215 2850 3341 $57.56 6.00
2005 10/12/05 1/15/06 13,857 11,024 2202 1390 $89.44 7.52
Note: Typically, eBayonly keeps auctionsonline for about90days fromtheend-of-saledate,
although auctions are oftenavailable for longer periodsdependingon comments and eBay's
purgingprogram.Thus, longperiodsof data collection require anagent tobe runover longer
periods.We ran our agent to collect data over several years, startingwith the 1999 rare coin
data set. Auction text does not contain any type of serial number or unique identifier for
coins, and thus we identify denomination, year, mint marks, and grade using a customized
text patternmatching. Our pattern-matching algorithmhas been tested against actual coin
and stamp collectors with 100% inter-rater reliability, so that no coin that was identified by
the agent was classified incorrectly according to coin and stamp collectors.
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the data, so even a large subset of outlying data will not cause a large
change in values of the estimators. A common approach to robust
regression is M-estimation, introduced by Huber [27]. This method uses
maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) to minimize the effects of hetero-
skedasticity. Another form of robust regression described by Mosteller
and Tukey [39] is called bi-weight (or bi-square) estimation. It adjusts for
extreme residuals using an iterative approach that determines a threshold
point for a constant in a function that has the capacity to place a zero
weight on extreme values. Our techniques mitigate the effects of
heteroskedasticity and extreme outliers, which are present in our data.
The result is a regression technique that yields consistent estimators.
4.3. Results
Table 2 contains the results of the Dickey–Fuller unit root analysis,
along with a column containing the bidder-to-auction ratio, which can
be considered as a measure of liquidity.
Liquidity is defined as the ability to sell an asset rapidly, with
minimal loss of value, anytime within market hours. Publicly-traded
securities typically are considered to be more liquid than items sold in
online auctions because of the immediacy with which publicly-traded
securities trades are able to be made. Thus, liquidity is an important
issue in online auctions also. Pratt [42] finds that market discounts on
closely held firms whose stock is not publicly traded may exceed 30%.
In online auctions, the more bidders there are, the more liquid the
auctioned assets, since a high number of bidders allows sellers to sell
items relatively quickly for good prices. As the number of bidders
decreases or the number of auctions increases, online auction market
liquidity decreases, and sellers face greater competition and fewer
buyers for their goods, which drives prices down.
We weighted our results to reduce the effect of thin trading using
the Dimson–Marshmethod, so that the results that we have presented
are robust. Our confidence in these results was strengthened based on
our evaluation of the unweighted results, which showed a similar
pattern. Similar patterns were also demonstrated by the results of
tests with outliers removed and alsowith data omitted to facilitate the
variance ratio analysis. The t-statistic is negative since the coefficient
that we tested actually is β−1 rather than simply β. Coefficient
estimates of a value βb1 will return negative t-statistics.
All of the years in Table 2 have unit root β values that are less than
1.0 and significant, although one, β2002, is very close to 1. The series of
β for all years can be interpreted as evidence of inefficiency resulting
in reversion to the mean. Collectible coin auctions that offer abnormally
low or high returns can be indicative of underpayment and over-
payment by the final bidder. By contrast, in an efficientmarket defined
by a random walk, β ought to be statistically no different from 1.0.
Fig. 1a and b show how the persistence of abnormal returns varies
with the bidder-to-auction ratio.
As the number of bidders increases, the persistence of abnormal
returns decreases, resulting in more temporary effects from abnormal
returns. As the number of auctions increases, the persistence of ab-
normal returns appears to increase, indicating that abnormal returns
tend to affect asset prices further into the future. When unanticipated
price changes persist into future sale prices (i.e., β=1.0), we can say
that the market is efficient. Similarly, if prices changes do not persist
into future sales, as is the case with this study (i.e., βb1.0), this
indicates themarket is inefficient. Oncewe establish inefficiencies in a
market, we then examine how long unanticipated price changes affect
future price levels, if at all.
Fig. 1a and b show that the unit root test and bidder-to-auction
ratio results have inverse patterns relative for the persistence of
abnormal returns, as measured by β for the coin data. They nearly
sketch mirror images of one another. When the bidder-to-auction
ratios were closer to the 1.0 level in 1999, 2000, and 2001 (i.e.,
β1999=0.749, β2000=0.698, β2001=0.835), the likelihood that the
market was efficient was lower due to the lower values of the unit root
test parameters. These results hint that liquidity is inversely rated to
efficiency and persistence in online auctions for coins. The relation-
ship may be more complicated; it is possible that liquidity loss will
scare away sellers, causing a reduction of the number of auctions,
increasing efficiency and price change persistence in later periods. We
do not find this here; it may take several years of continuous data
collection to resolve this issue. A bidder-to-auction ratio near to 1.0
indicates that the number of bidders approaches the number of
auctions. Because we aggregate at the year level, there are very few
data points. However, evenwith a small sample size, we find a−85.9%
correlation between the bidder-to-auction ratio and β at the yearly
level, with a p-value of about 0.02, making this inverse relationship
statistically significant. This strengthens our observation of an inverse
relationship between the bidder-to-auction ratio and the persistence
of abnormal returns.
When the bidder-to-auction ratio fell to the 0.40 level in 2002, the
estimated value of β from the unit root test approached very close to
1.0 (β2002=.999), with a tight confidence interval of [0.9989, 0.9994].
In 2005, the persistence of abnormal returns as they relate to market
Table 2
Impact of previous returns on current returns for the coin data.
Year Bidder-to-
auction ratio
Unit root test Variance ratio (V) tests
β q=2 Q=3 q=4
1999 0.82 0.749⁎⁎⁎ 0.346⁎⁎⁎ 0.368⁎⁎⁎ 0.397⁎⁎⁎
2000 0.99 0.698⁎⁎⁎ 0.422⁎⁎⁎ 0.534⁎⁎⁎ 0.401⁎⁎⁎
2001 0.95 0.835⁎⁎⁎ 0.377⁎⁎⁎ 0.507⁎⁎⁎ 0.492⁎⁎⁎
2002 0.40 0.999⁎⁎⁎ 0.403⁎⁎⁎ 0.378⁎⁎⁎ 0.381⁎⁎⁎
2005 0.80 0.871⁎⁎⁎ 0.388⁎⁎⁎ 0.372⁎⁎⁎ 0.375⁎⁎⁎
Note: ⁎⁎⁎pb .001. Unit root tests to establish the parameter, β, use robust regression.We
employ variance ratio tests that examine the sample in two (q=2), three (q=3) and
four (q=4) subsets to examine how the variances changed across different groupings
of the data. A β➔1.00 in the unit root tests is indicative of an efficient market. A
variance ratio, V, of 1.00 is indicative of an efficient market also.
Fig. 1. Test results for the coin data, 1999–2002, and 2005. Note: β=1.0 means that the
current return is as likely to increase or to decrease, indicating an efficient market. With
estimated values of βb1.0, however, our results suggest inefficiencies in the online coin
market. a. Unit root test results. b. Bidder-to-auction ratio results.
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efficiency, β2005, appears to have fallen to roughly 0.87, as the bidder-
to-auction ratio increased to 0.80. Though our sample size is large
enough to detect relatively small effects, the estimated value of β2002
from the unit root analysis is so close to 1.0 that one could argue that
there is no practical difference, even though there is a statistically
significant difference. This is an interesting result. It permits us to
preliminarily conclude that the online market for collectible coins
approached efficiency in 2002. Malkiel [36] makes a similar argument
with critics of efficiency in the stock market, by claiming that markets
are so close to efficiency in these cases that profiting from
inefficiencies won't even cover the listing charges. As can be seen in
Fig. 1b, these rises and falls roughly correspond to increases and
decreases in the bidder-to-auction ratio. This offers a strong implica-
tion that online auction markets can increase the persistence of
abnormal returns if there are enough auctions compared to bidders.
We contend that these results show that, regardless of the number of
items for sale, the same number of bidders pursues the same number
of goods looking for purchases. With more auctions to choose from,
the persistence of abnormal returns appears to increase as bidders are
able to better compare prices and participate in different auctions.
Cochrane [10] informsus that the variance ratios are indicative of the
percentage of variability due to a randomwalk. The variance ratios in all
of the tests that we conducted hovered around 41% (VAverage=0.409 to
be exact, with VMinimum=0.346 and VMaximum=0.534). Thus, Table 2
suggests that about 59% of the total variance of returns cannot be
explained by a randomwalk. This indicates that coin returns are trend-
stationary andmean-reverting over this timeperiod, and have relatively
little permanent random walk component. Thus, using both unit root
tests and variance ratio tests gives us an indication that coin asset prices
do regress toward a mean, but that the prices are mean-reverting at
different rates. They revert more slowly as the number of bidders
increases or the number of auctions decreases.
5. Study 2: online market efficiency for collectible stamps
We now look at market efficiency and the persistence of abnormal
returns over time for stamps.
5.1. The collectible stamp data
We obtained stamp price data for this study from individual stamp
auction sites on eBay (via stamps.ebay.com) with the use of software
agents to support data collection. The agents targeted auctions of U.S.
stamps in mint or unused condition, issued in or before 1940, with data
gathered between April 6, 2007 and October 6, 2007. The agents
obtained prices, the condition of the stamp for sale and the
characteristics of buyers and sellers. Item text was analyzed to
determine standard qualitymeasures for each stamp. (For stampquality
terms, seewww.glassinesurfer.com/stamp_collecting/gsgrading.shtml.)
Typical stamp industry standard quality measures include whether the
stamp has been used, if the gum has been damaged by hinging, how
good the color quality is, and whether there are problems with the
centering of the image in the stamp. As with coins, there are also
technical terms used to describe a stamp's condition, such as “fine,”
“very fine,” “fine-very fine,” and “mint.” Items that did not sell, auctions
with the exercise of a buy-it-now option, and listings containing
multiple items were excluded.
We gave much consideration to the refinement of the search criteria
that determined the data we collected. Stamps come in a variety of
formats, including cancelled and unused, rectangular panes and
numbered plate blocks, coils, and first-day-of-issue covers. The issues
also vary from regular post to air mail, to government mail and parcel
post, and tax stamps. To limit the scope of our data collection,we focused
on auctions for single unused stamps. We excluded selling multiple
stamps (e.g., a roll of stamps), stamp equipment (e.g., mounting hinges
for placement in a book), or reproductions. We also eliminated auctions
where the exact stamp could not be identified by the description (e.g.,
“1977 Stamp for Sale”) or where the condition of the stamp was suspect
(e.g., “extra fine, but damaged,” “mint with hole,” etc.). Our filtering
effort was intended to ensure that stamps were being compared to like
stamps. About one out of forty auctions whose data we gathered did not
fit our criteria, and we excluded them from analysis as a result.
Our data can be categorized into two different sub-markets of
stamps. Many stamp collectors concentrate, on only one of these sub-
markets. Table 3 describes the data that we collected in terms of the
different stamp categories. It was not feasible to divide the stamp data
by time as we did with the coin data. There would likely be an overlap
in the bidders who were following and bidding on the stamps. This
would lead to issues in using the number of bidders as a proxy for
market participants. The overlaps were always less than 25% of the
total number of bidders, which was acceptable to us, although no
overlaps – such as in the coin data – would have been better.
5.2. Estimation issues
Analysis of our stamp data required many of the same controls that
were required by the coin data set, only based on the different descriptors
that are used to identify the quality of stamps. These include conditions
grades (e.g., mint, fine and very fine), and other specialized marks or
conditions (e.g., never hinged). Our approach regarding the elimination of
outliers involved identifying andomittingobservations forwhich ln(Price)
was outside a band bounded by three standard deviations of the mean
(i.e., the 99th percentile band). This excluded less than 1% of the data. The
logarithmsof the stampprice changedatawere skewedright, andviolated
the normality distribution assumptions associated with OLS regression.
Thus,weemployed the samerobustbi-weight andM-estimationmethods
as we did for the collectible coins.
In addition to the typical econometric issues that we described earlier
for coins, and for which we made the appropriate tests and adjustments,
one of the primary challenges in working with data of the sort that are
involved in analyzing online stamp market efficiency has to do with the
manner in which we determine what comparisons are to be made for
prices. It is critical to understandwhat is possible in terms of comparing a
current transaction price to a prior transaction price of a stamp, as a basis
for identifyingpricemovement. Inourdata setof stamps, itwaspossible to
observe stamps that traded irregularly (as you might expect for markets
with thinly-traded assets), sometimes with several days or weeks
between trades of an individual stamp. As a result, to support effective
coding, we found that it was appropriate to apply an approach that was
used by Dimson and Marsh [18], involving weighted measures for the
asset returns based on the number of days since the time when the
previous trade occurred.
Another estimation issue was determining the number of price
observations to be included to assess price changes via the unit root
Table 3
Data collected for the empirical study of the efficiency of the online stamp market.
Category Number of auctions Bidders Sellers
1800–1900 2971 1035 487
1900–1940 5567 1796 623
Totals 8538 2831 1110
Note: Data from April 4, 2007 to October 4, 2007. They are continuous in time, with the
exception of seven days of data lost during June 2007, when the computer running the
agents was moved to a data center. Another two days of data were lost due to technical
issues. Theoriginal data had two additional categories, includingAirMailwith 202 auctions
and 94 bidders, and Alaska Yukon with 78 auctions and 68 bidders, respectively. These
auctions were removed from our study because we have reason to believe that there were
many more bidders, perhaps thousands, who were reviewing these stamp auctions
concurrentlywith stampauctions in the1800 and1900 categories.With such a lownumber
of auctions in a sub-market where the overall market has thousands more auctions, the
number of bidders thatwe could identifymaynot represent the actual count of bidders that
were reviewing themarket. As a result, we caution other researchers tomake sure that they
have enough market liquidity before they try to perform this kind of analysis.
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and the variance ratio analyses. Recognizing the limitations of using a
small amount of data for the price series versus using a small number
of auctions, our research design involved a trade-off. This trade-off
was between including stamps that had enough observations in their
price change time-series relative to including enough bidders and
auctions, so as to be representative of the actual trading that was
occurring in the market. We determined that it was feasible to use
stamps with fifteen price observations to obtain as few as fourteen
price change data points, which still yielded a large enough number of
bidders and auctions so our analytical approach was viable.
5.3. Results
Table 4 shows empirical results from an examination of the stamp
sub-markets for 1800 to 1899 and 1900 to 1940, along with unit root
test and variance ratio results on the price change series. The bidder-
to-auction ratio for stamps from 1800 to 1899 is 0.35, and for stamps
from 1900 to 1940 is 0.32. Although there are some notable
differences, the results of the stamp data are similar to the results of
the coin data at a high level of inspection. Both data sets were
collected from eBay collectors' markets.
All of the unit root β values are less than one and significant
(β1800–1899=0.901, pb0.001; β1900–1940=0.898, pb0.001). This
suggests that the online auction stamp market is not efficient, and
that prices eventually trend toward a mean. However, abnormal
returns in this market show a high level of persistence and tend to
revert slowly back to amean.We are examining daily returns, so even
values close to 1 but with a significant difference will still revert to a
mean. We consider these not to be efficient. For example, a 90%
persistence of abnormal returns indicates that after 30 days only
4.24% (=.9030) of the abnormal returns will still be reflected in the
price of the item. This further indicates that previous abnormally
high or low returns are reflected in the market for some time before
the effects finally disappear. We also conducted sensitivity analysis
for the unit root coefficients and variance ratios in relation to the
minimum number of price change observations required inclusion in
the study. A time-series of fifteen price changes was required. We
tested data sets with as few as ten and as many as twenty price
changes in a group. In each case, the unit roots and the variance ratios
were significantly different from one.
The variance ratios averaged about 0.37 (VAverage=0.367,
VMinimum=0.325 and VMaximum=0.428). This suggests that just
over 60% of the variation cannot be explained by a random walk.
Thus, as with the coin data, the stamp data appear to be trend-
stationary and mean-reverting, at least over the time period that
we observed the prices of these stamps. The variance ratios are
similar for both sub-markets (i.e., Vq=2: 0.418; Vq=3: 0.355; and
Vq=4: 0.330 for the 1900–1940 stamps versus Vq=2: 0.428; Vq=3:
0.347; and Vq=4: 0.325 for the 1800–1899 stamps). Though the
differences in these variance ratios are not large, the results sug-
gest that the amount of variability accounted for by the random
walk may be associated with an increase in market liquidity as
indicated by a decrease in the bidder-to-auction ratio.
The 1800 to 1899 stamp sub-market, with 2971 auctions, is roughly
half the thickness of the 1900 to 1940 stamp sub-market, with 5567
auctions in this study. We note that the market thickness, in and of
itself, has little effect on the variance associated with a random walk.
Although the market appears to be inefficient in that stamp prices tend
to revert to the mean, the abnormal returns we observed show a great
deal of persistence, approaching 0.9, with 1.0 being perfect persistence.
Our results are interesting in that the economic literature on the
thickness of markets does not seem to apply too well to the online
auctions in this study. However, the inefficiencies we have observed
suggest that even though technology has improved these thin markets,
it still has not completely eliminated inefficiencies in online auctions.
6. Discussion
Online auctions have created market liquidity and made available
auction-like market mechanisms in settings where traditional auctions
often have catered to a very select and small number of participants. Now
online auctions reachmillions of participants, with thousands of potential
bidders for each auction. As market depth and liquidity increase in online
auctions, researchers should view investments in collectibles through the
lens of financial economics. We assessed coin and stamp markets for
efficiency, usingmethods similar to thoseused tomeasureefficiencyof the
stock markets. We applied two different methods of measuring random
walks to our data. Our exploration of market efficiency here points to
similarities and differences between the markets. Through this process,
weare able topointoutnewfindings that contribute toourunderstanding
about the potential for speculation in online auctions of collectibles.
Cochrane [10] shows that, for a market to be efficient and contain a
random walk, the variance needs to be consistent throughout the
market. The variance ratio ought to be approximately equal to 1.0 in an
efficient market. We performed variance ratio analysis in the two
markets. The variance ratios of the coin sub-markets that we studied
range from 0.346 to 0.534. The results were similar to the two stamp
sub-markets, where the variance ratios form a tighter range from 0.325
to 0.428. We observed that in both coin and stamp markets the
variability that is not explained by random walks hovers around 60%.
This result is interesting; thesemarkets contain similar variability of the
effects of randomwalks in conjunctionwith different degrees of market
liquidity. The conventional wisdom suggests greater market depth
results in a tendency toward efficiency, yet we found that this is not
necessarily so with our online auction data. Market depth had little
effect on efficiency in online auctions, but market liquiditymeasured by
the ratio of buyers to auctions seems to have an inverse relationship on
persistence of abnormal returns in the collectible markets, approaching
an efficient market as the number of bidders decreases.
Second, using unit root analysis, both our sub-markets showed a
significant difference in persistence of abnormal returns that
appears to have a relationship with the bidder-to-auction ratio. We
find that the number of bidders in relation to the number of auctions
seems to be correlated with the persistence of abnormal returns,
based on period-to-period price changes, in online auction collec-
tible markets. Markets with a lower number of bidders per auction
showed more persistence of abnormal returns than markets with a
high number of bidders per auction. The persistence of abnormal
returns in both the collectible coin and stamp markets approaches
1.0 as the bidder-to-auction ratio drops to around 40%. The increase
in persistence of abnormal returns is due to increased in bidder
competition. When there are more bidders vying for the same item,
the persistence of the abnormal returns declines. Thus, if bidder
competition increases and there are more bidders competing for
fewer auctions, then an individual bidder will have a greater chance
to have a larger impact on price. This is in strong contrast to a less
Table 4
Impact of prior returns on current returns for the stamp data, 1800s and 1900s stamps.
Century Bidder-to-
auction ratio
Unit root test Variance ratio (V) tests
β Q=2 q=3 Q=4
1800–1899 0.35 0.901⁎⁎⁎ 0.428⁎⁎⁎ 0.347⁎⁎⁎ 0.325⁎⁎⁎
1900–1940 0.32 0.898⁎⁎⁎ 0.418⁎⁎⁎ 0.355⁎⁎⁎ 0.330⁎⁎⁎
Note: All price change series used in this analysis include no fewer than 15 price change
observations. We felt that this was appropriate because the stamp data exhibits thinner
trading than the coin data. The coin data had no fewer than 25 price change
observations. Using no fewer than 15 stamp price observations helped us to preserve
the number of data points that were used to establish the β and V values above. In
addition, this choice had no critical impact on the variance ratios that we estimated. We
used unit root tests to establish the unit root test parameters, β, via robust regression.
We employed variance ratio tests on the sample in two (q=2), three (q=3) and four
(q=4) subsets to examine how the variances changed across the groupings of the data.
Signif.: ⁎⁎⁎pb .001.
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competitive environment, where bidders can choose the auctions in
which they wish to participate with greater ease. This will tend to
stabilize returns and allow abnormal returns to persist into the future.
7. Conclusion
This research examines the efficiency of Internet auctions from a
financial economics point of view. We analyzed online auction
markets for stamps and coins to gauge efficiency, and the possible
explanations consistent with the observed empirical regularities.
7.1. Contributions
Our research points out that that there are differences between the
stockmarket and the online auctionmarket, including the inability to sell
short in the online auction market and the ability of two investors to
easily influence the price of items in online auction markets. These
differences can lead to inefficiencies so that the prices of assets sold in
online auction markets do not reflect all information available to traders
and investors in thatmarket. An alert investor canmake excessive profits
when investing in assets in an inefficient market when compared to
investments made in an efficient market. Our research shows that the
online auctions that we studied are not altogether efficient, but that they
approach efficiency as the number of bidders decreases in relation to the
number of auctions. Our major contribution is to document their
presence and show how inefficiencies in the collectible online auction
markets may arise. A related contribution is to show that these
inefficiencies can be diminished as the number of auctions increases
with respect to the number of bidders. Moreover, we point out that it is
feasible and beneficial in the long run that an inefficient online auction
market will attract sellers who can profit from these inefficiencies to the
point where the market approaches efficiency.
We find that the persistence of abnormal returns required for an
efficient market may ensue as the number of bidders decreases in
relation to the number of auctions. This is due, we argue, to online
auction bidders' ability to examine prices in concurrent and past auctions
to determine a proper bid level, and to observe the lower level of bidder
competition, consistent with lower levels of the bidder-to-auction ratio.
Since eBay's auction mechanism mimics a second-price sealed-bid
auction, it is impossible for a single uninformed bidder to be a price-
maker. However, two bidders acting in concert can affect a price. As the
number of bidders decreases or bidders begin to have more auctions to
search and select (or both), it will be harder to find two uniformed
bidders who are bidding on the same item.
We have discussed the similarities and differences between the
rare coin and rare stamp collectible online markets at length in this
article. We established somewhat different results for collectible
stamp auctions than we did for the coin markets, although the main
features of the results were retained. We found evidence of persistent
returns rather than full market efficiency with more thinly-traded
stamps, and similar degrees of variance in returns tied to the apparent
random walk component of returns.
For the collectible coin markets that we analyzed in different time
periods spanning seven years, we detected an inverse relationship
between the persistence of abnormal returns and the bidder-to-auction
ratio. We also revealed inefficiencies in the collectible markets where a
speculator might have an opportunity to take advantage of abnormally
low sale prices for stamps or coins and resell them for abnormally high
prices. Our variance ratio tests show that these inefficiencies are
relatively consistent, despite some differences in market liquidity over
the years. The collectible stamp markets that we analyzed showed
similar and relatively high levels of persistence of abnormal returns,
coupled with relatively low bidder-to-auction ratios, as is consistent
withwhatwe find in the rare coinmarket. Our unit root tests suggested
that abnormal returns of prior auctions tend to fade, as the returns
revert to their mean levels.
Our research also delivers a number of contributions that offer
surprise value and interesting new knowledge for academic research in
IS, finance, and e-commerce, and for the managerial practices involved
in the development of online auctionmarkets. One contribution thatwe
offer is to demonstrate the use of empirical evaluation techniques that
provide evidence about whether online auction markets for collectible
coins and stamps are efficient. We also measured the persistence of
abnormal returns thatmay occur in these onlinemarkets. Our empirical
analysis shows the interplay between the results of randomwalk tests,
based on both unit root tests and variance ratio tests, for market
efficiency and the persistence of abnormal returns. We examined the
bidder-to-auction ratio to show contrasts betweenwhat happens to our
estimates with respect to the unit roots for persistence of abnormal
returns.We also applied a variance ratio analysis approach to gauge the
extent to which the movement of coin and stamp asset prices and
returns in online auctions are comprised of a randomwalk component.
We alsousedunit root tests andvariance ratio tests to show the extent to
which there is reversion to a mean value as a result of market
inefficiency. Finally, we illustrated the use of different approaches to
the segmentation of our data to test market efficiency across different
numbers of periods (and numbers of transactions, in the case of thinner
asset trading), as well as across different asset categories.
7.2. Limitations and future research
We learned that the bidder-to-auction ratio is important in
determining the level of persistence in abnormal returns in online
auctions, and that market liquidity has little effect on the persistence of
abnormal returns and on the amount of variance explained by random
walks. Our insights are consistentwithvarious stockmarketphenomena
that have been observed by others, such as bubbles, butwe nevertheless
caution readers to limit their interpretation of our results to online
auctions.
It is appropriate to point out to the reader that there is typically a
great deal of measurement noise that goes along with the evaluation
of online auction performance. Our research should not be viewed as
an exception to this rule. Future research has the potential to provide a
clearer picture of the effects of the bidder-to-auction ratio, especially
in an even larger data set for the stamp market, so that we can ensure
that there are no overlaps in the population of bidders across the
different asset categories. In addition, we intentionally dropped
certain sub-markets for collectible stamps that exhibited too thin
trading in the time frame of our study. Wewere not confident that the
number of bidders who observed the market was accurately reflected
when only a small sample of auctions is retrieved. Clearly, data from
thicker markets are appropriate before such analysis should be
attempted. Indeed, there needs to be thousands of observations,
before it is possible to effectively examine a market to determine its
efficiency, the persistence of abnormal returns after different kinds of
shocks occur, and the effects of the bidder-to-auction ratio.
We only investigated twomarkets over a limited period of time. Our
findings may not generalize to other auction markets. Nevertheless, the
methodological approach that we have demonstrated should be helpful
as a basis for effective exploration of different online market contexts.
Other researchers will benefit from thinking through some newways to
refine our techniques to make them more effective. Readers can take
awayother implications too. Sellers naturallywant to operate inmarkets
that provide depth,market liquidity, participation, and offer appropriate
sale prices. They appreciate how online auction markets support
effective price discovery. Yet they are likely to gravitate toward markets
with higher levels of participation, since the presence of many bidders
and auctions creates a basis for inefficiencies and thus the chance that
they can sell their items at an increased price. Speculators may
appreciate inefficiencies – both as buyers and sellers – and may wish
to participate in online auctionswithmany buyers, but fewer competing
auctions, in an effort to profit from the available inefficiencies.
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